The Future of Science Governance: A review of public concerns, governance and institutional response by Chilvers, J & Macnaghten, P
  
 
The Future of Science Governance 
 
A review of public concerns, governance and 
institutional response 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A literature review for the BIS/Sciencewise-ERC ‘Science, Trust and Public 
Engagement’ project  
 
 
Jason Chilvers and Phil Macnaghten  
 
 
 
April 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
About the Authors 
 
 
Jason Chilvers 
School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia 
jason.chilvers@uea.ac.uk   
 
Jason is a lecturer and social scientist in the School of Environmental Sciences at 
the University of East Anglia. His work spans governance, appraisal, public 
understanding, and public participation relating to science, technology and 
environmental risk issues. For over a decade he has conducted research, practice 
and teaching on public dialogue and deliberative public engagement in the areas of 
sustainability, energy, waste, and emerging technologies. This has included the 
development of innovative approaches (such as collaborative work on Deliberative 
Mapping), evaluation, and initiating critical studies of participation in science and the 
environment, including one of the first ever studies of public engagement experts and 
the networks, roles and relations they form around public dialogue. He has published 
widely on these themes in books, policy reports, and peer-reviewed international 
journals such as Science, Technology and Human Values, Environment and 
Planning A, Geoforum and the Journal of Risk Research. He is the director of a two-
year ESRC seminar series on critical public engagement. 
 
 
 
Phil Macnaghten 
Department of Geography, Durham University 
p.m.macnaghten@durham.ac.uk  
 
Phil is Professor of Geography at Durham University. His research has concentrated 
on the governance of science and technology, the sociology of nature and the 
environment, public deliberation, comparative research, and qualitative methodology 
with a particular emphasis on discourse and narrative approaches. He has worked 
closely with policy organisations, NGOs and think tanks, and has recently 
coordinated the European framework project DEEPEN – Deepening Ethical 
Engagement and Participation in Emerging Nanotechnologies. His principal 
publications include: Contested Natures (Sage, 1998), Bodies of Nature (Sage, 
2001), Governing at the Nanoscale (Demos, 2006), Reconfiguring Responsibility 
(European Commission, 2009) as well as a number of edited collections and papers. 
He contributes to debates on the governance of science and technology in the UK, 
Europe and Brazil and is currently a member of the EPSRC’s Societal Issues Panel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
Executive Summary 
 
Background 
• Science and technology have increased their potential to disrupt societies, 
cultures and politics, for good and bad. The governance of science has 
evolved over the last few decades to accommodate this disruptive power but 
vulnerabilities remain. As the recent events surrounding ‘Climategate’ attest, 
systems of governance and public expectations can remain out of step, and 
public credibility of science remains fragile.  
• Public dialogue and upstream forms of engagement have been key 
ingredients in the new scientific governance, as a way of embedding public 
concerns and values into the scientific process, as an instrument to help 
avoid downstream controversy, and more recently as part of a wider set of 
governance responses and mechanisms.  
• The Sciencewise Expert Resource Centre (Sciencewise-ERC)1 has been at 
the forefront of public dialogue over the past five years. It has constructed and 
guided a number of important dialogue projects on issues from 
nanotechnology and stem cell research to the use of DNA in forensics and 
building low carbon communities. Yet, while Sciencewise-ERC has also done 
much to encourage the appetite for public dialogue within government and its 
agencies, the impact of such initiatives on commissioning and target 
institutions themselves remains unclear. 
 
The Review 
• This review forms part of a wider BIS/Sciencewise-ERC project on ‘Science, 
trust and public engagement’. It was a precursor to and went on to inform 
other elements in the first strand of the project, including in-depth interviews, 
ethnographic research and a workshop hosted by the Royal Society (see 
TNS-BMRB, 2011). The overall aim of the study was to understand how 
institutions frame the governance issues that have been at the forefront of 
public concerns around science and technology. 
  
• In this report we review the findings from public dialogues, systematically 
evaluating the concerns that are shared across 17 Sciencewise-ERC 
sponsored public dialogues projects. We then explore in detail how science 
and policy institutions are responding to governance challenges in the fields 
of genomics, nanotechnology and climate science.  
                                                        
1
 The Sciencewise Expert Resource Centre (Sciencewise-ERC), funded by the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), helps policy makers to understand and use public dialogue to 
inspire, inform and improve policy decisions around science and technology. It consists of a 
comprehensive online resource of information, advice and guidance together with a wide range of 
support services aimed at policy makers and all the different stakeholders involved in science and 
technology policy making, including the public. Sciencewise-ERC also provides co-funding to 
government departments and agencies to develop and commission public dialogue activities (see 
www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk). 
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The Sciencewise-ERC Dialogues 
• We find the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues as marking a more mature phase of 
government thinking towards public engagement, yet within the projects we 
identify three distinctive models for how dialogue can inform the policy 
process: The Upstream Model; The Honest Broker Model; and The Issue 
Advocate Model. 
• We identify five common themes that capture the crosscutting features of 
public concern and that pose considerable challenges for the governance of 
science. These are: 
• People’s considerable ambivalence towards the purposes that drive 
science, technology and innovation and with the motivations of those 
involved.  
 
• The relative lack of trust invested in government to act in the public 
interest – for example, in domains such as food and biotechnology where 
there is a perceived proximity between government and the interests of 
industry.  
 
• Their sense of feeling excluded from deciding what kinds of science and 
technology gets funded and from what values and aspirations are fed into 
the science and innovation process.  
 
• Unease that the pace of scientific and technological development exceeds 
its scope for ethical and regulatory oversight and that it may take us in 
directions that have not been adequately considered in advance.  
 
• Concern with whether the culture of science discourages scientists from 
voicing concerns over potential risks and uncertainties, or reflecting on 
wider social and ethical considerations.  
 
Mapping Science Governance Responses 
• Mapping the ways in which science and policy institutions are responding to 
these governance challenges in the fields of genomics, nanotechnology and 
climate science suggest the following trends: 
• Moves to go beyond formal deliberative processes towards a more 
diverse range of mechanisms through which scientists and institutions can 
be exposed to public issues – including listening to ‘uninvited engagement 
spaces’ (such as the blogosphere) and various forms of outreach, 
knowledge transfer and exchange.  
 
• Governance responses associated with more distributed and open forms 
of innovation – such as opensourcing, crowdsourcing, and co-design – 
but questions remain whether these are merely extractive processes or 
whether they offer the public a genuine role in shaping scientific and 
technological innovation. 
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• Explicit commitments to institutional redesign towards openness, 
transparency, and accountability, prevalent in the area of genomics in the 
1990s, have recently come to the fore in the climate change context. The 
dynamic through which change materialises in practice raises questions 
over the role of public resistance and controversy in mediating 
governance responses. 
• The development of voluntary codes of conduct as an alternative to purely 
regulatory or top-down audit practices is evident. The effectiveness of this 
change remains unclear, with the main emphasis being on communication 
and education in relation to these voluntary mechanisms. 
 
• While the main focus of the review is on novel and emergent governance 
responses it is important to recognise the value of established 
governance mechanisms, such as ethical codes of conduct, ethics review 
committees, public engagement mechanisms, and culture change 
programmes. 
 
Conclusions 
• As a result of this review, the report concludes that while some of the 
governance issues identified in the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues are at least 
partly responded to by science and policy institutions (concerns about 
inclusion for example) others are less evident (such as concerns over the 
purposes of emerging science and technology and the speed of innovation 
processes).  
• Responding to such issues remains a strategic challenge for government and 
policy institutions charged with the governance of science. 
• Understanding how institutions respond to governance challenges is 
complex, poorly explained in past social scientific research, and understood 
best through in-depth and grounded research strategies. Such inquiry needs 
to embrace: 
• A contextual approach that allows for the complex interplay of multiple 
actors, intermediaries and possible influences.  
• A nuanced understanding of the processes by which organisations learn 
and change, including the possible barriers, drivers, and influences of 
institutional response.  
• An awareness of the prevailing conditions, or wider ‘driving forces’, that 
shape the governance of science and technology including: the political 
economy of emerging science and technologies; the increasingly 
globalised nature of science and technology; and power relations. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
Over the course of the 20th century and into the 21st, science and technology have 
increased their potential to disrupt societies, cultures and politics, in positive and 
negative ways. The governance of science has evolved over the last few decades to 
begin to accommodate some of the public concerns that reflect this disruptive power. 
But events remind us that there is still a disconnect between systems of governance 
and public expectations. This has been illustrated most recently in the climate 
change context, where the ‘Climategate’ controversy and intense public scrutiny of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) procedures and scientific 
assessments has revealed the extent of demands for transparency in the practice of 
science among amateur scientists and others in civil society. The impact these 
controversies have had on public perceptions of climate science has been marked, 
suggesting that the public credibility of science in high-stakes areas is remarkably 
fragile, and prompting a range of governance responses (InterAcademy Council, 
2010; Russell et al., 2010). 
 
In the UK, the ability of institutions to anticipate and take account of public reactions 
to science and technological risk has been a major challenge to science governance. 
The controversy surrounding genetically modified (GM) foods and crops in the late 
1990s, followed by mad cow disease and the uncertainties surrounding the link 
between bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease 
(CJD), led to a number of influential policy reports calling for more proactive public 
involvement and deliberation in debates about the social and ethical dimensions of 
science and technology (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1998; 
House of Lords, 2000; HM Treasury, 2004; Wilsdon & Willis, 2004).  
 
In many respects the resulting shift to public dialogue and upstream engagement has 
been a dominant governance response to this so-called ‘crisis of confidence’. The 
Sciencewise Expert Resource Centre (Sciencewise-ERC), funded by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, has been at the forefront of this response, 
initiating innovative and comprehensive public dialogue over the past five years. It 
has constructed and guided a number of important projects, on issues from 
nanotechnology and stem cell research to the use of DNA in forensics and building 
low carbon communities. The Sciencewise-ERC has also fulfilled a significant role in 
encouraging the appetite for public dialogue within government and its agencies. 
However, while there has been a range of innovation in participatory processes 
during this time, the extent and nature of the impact of these dialogue initiatives on 
commissioning and target institutions remains unclear. 
 
During this period, there have also been changes to the policy and institutional 
context into which public dialogue played out. The Sciencewise-ERC has moved 
from a focus on funding dialogue to providing other resources for policy makers – not 
least through the provision of opportunities for training and networking, as well as 
through guidance on best practice. There has been the development of the Beacons 
for Public Engagement together with greater funding and support from the research 
councils and HEFCE to help embed public engagement in science within universities. 
There have been new governmental initiatives, such as Science for All and Science 
and Trust, which have attempted to encourage new forms of institutional 
engagement – including a call for a ‘public compact’ on crosscutting issues of 
science and technology, resulting in the Concordat for Engaging the Public With 
Research, launched in December 2010. 
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These recent developments are indicative of a more general shift in institutional 
rhetoric and practice from a focus on public dialogue and engagement in responding 
to issues of public trust in science, towards a broader appreciation of the governance 
of science, technology and innovation2 (and science in governance) system as a 
whole in which public engagement and science-society interactions form an 
important part. There are three main dimensions to this:  
1. The increasing recognition that formal invited public dialogue and engagement is 
actually only one of many ways in which public issues and concerns in relation to 
science and technology can be expressed, heard, and have an influence on 
science and decision-making (i.e. towards an appreciation of the diverse forms of 
social intelligence, public dialogue and wider public debate that exist on such 
issues; see Marres, 2007; Wynne, 2007; Chilvers, 2010). 
2. The realisation that people tend not to be for or against a particular science or 
technology, rather they remain ambivalent, developing views that are contingent 
on how the science is being governed in real world circumstances: how adequate 
are current patterns of regulation; who will be responsible if things go wrong; can 
they be trusted; is the technology seen as imposed or open to change; who is this 
technology for; why this technology and not another; and so on (i.e. towards a 
realisation that governance issues are of central importance to citizens; see 
Wilsdon & Willis, 2004; Kearnes et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2009).  
3. An appreciation that responses to these issues involve the whole science 
governance system and its global connections (i.e. towards a wider appreciation 
of possible governance responses and mechanisms;3 see Felt & Wynne, 2007; 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2008). 
Within this changing context and shift in emphasis from dialogue to governance, it is 
no doubt important to understand, develop and innovate new governance 
mechanisms. It is not as simple as this however. The project for which this literature 
review forms the basis takes the view that, as an essential precursor to such efforts, 
a much better understanding of the institutional context concerning the governance 
of science is needed. Such understanding is crucial due to: the varied impact of past 
practice (including public dialogue) in influencing institutional response; the range 
and complexity of existing governance mechanisms already in place; and the fact 
that any proposed new governance mechanisms should have precisely this 
understanding in mind.  
 
The objectives of this review are threefold. The first is on understanding science 
governance issues and concerns expressed by the public, especially those that have 
emerged from existing public dialogues. This forms the focus of Chapter 2, where 
we undertake a systematic review of crosscutting governance concerns that have 
emerged out of 17 public dialogues co-funded by Sciencewise-ERC. The second 
objective is to map out the diversity of governance responses emerging in complex 
areas of science, technology and innovation. This forms the focus of Chapter 3, 
where we review the ways in which science and policy institutions, and scientists, are 
responding to governance challenges in the fields of genomics, nanotechnology and 
climate science. The third objective of our review is to make some initial observations 
on the connections between public concerns about the governance of science and 
                                                        
2
 The scope of this review is the governance of science, technology and innovation. At points throughout 
the review the terms ‘governance of science’ or ‘science governance’ are used as shorthand but are 
inclusive of this broader meaning. 
3
 Some examples of these possible governance responses and mechanisms are given in Chapter 3 of 
this report. 
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actual governance responses. This is undertaken in Chapter 4, where we provide a 
synthesis of the key messages emerging from Chapters 2 and 3 of this report and 
reflect on connections between them, including the factors that shape institutional 
response, which will be further explored through grounded in-depth qualitative 
research to be undertaken in later phases of the project.  
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Chapter 2: THE SCIENCEWISE-ERC 
DIALOGUES 
In this chapter we analyse the science governance issues and concerns expressed 
by publics in a range of dialogue processes. The focus of our review is crosscutting 
governance concerns that have emerged out of 17 public dialogues co-funded by 
Sciencewise-ERC. We begin by identifying what has been distinctive about 
Sciencewise-ERC public dialogue events, before characterising the different models 
of public engagement evident within these dialogues. We then present our analysis 
of the governance issues emerging from these dialogues around five main themes, 
each relating to a crosscutting feature of public concern on the governance of 
science and technology.  A full list of the 17 Sciencewise-ERC dialogues reviewed in 
this chapter and other supporting documentation is provided in Appendix 1. 
What is distinctive about Sciencewise-ERC 
The Sciencewise-ERC initiative marks a distinctive phase of government thinking 
towards public engagement. Following earlier attempts aimed at one-way science 
communication initiatives (Phase 1), and subsequent initiatives aimed at changing 
the rhetoric from deficit models of public understanding to dialogue models of public 
engagement (Phase 2), the Sciencewise-ERC aims to promote public dialogue that 
explicitly inspires and informs better policy in science and technology in the UK. 
Specifically, this is to be achieved through three objectives: (1) supporting and 
stimulating new flagship public dialogue projects of different types to inspire and 
inform better science and technology policy; (2) since 2008, becoming an opinion 
leader and trusted source of information in the role of public dialogue; and (3) 
embedding public dialogue in the day to day working of policy institutions through the 
provision of a range of tailored guidance, tools and support. The intention is not to 
supersede other more traditional forms of science communication, but to 
complement them with public dialogue in situations where it is appropriate. 
Following Stirling (2005) we can identify competing and overlapping rationales that 
underpin the use of public dialogue in Sciencewise-ERC projects. These can be 
distinguished into the normative (e.g. that dialogue is the right thing to do for reasons 
of democracy, equity, equality and justice), the instrumental (e.g. that dialogue 
provides social intelligence to deliver pre-committed policy objectives, such as those 
of building trust or of avoiding adverse public reaction), and the substantive (e.g. that 
policy choices can be co-produced with publics in ways that authentically embody 
diverse social knowledges, values and meanings in a substantive manner). Although 
this distinction is based on ideal types it nevertheless sets the context of our first 
observation: that Sciencewise-ERC has promoted a shift of government thinking for 
public dialogue from an instrumental to a substantive rationale based on valuing 
multiple perspectives. 
Evidence for such a shift can be identified in the guidance and advice streams in 
Sciencewise-ERC’s Resource Library on what constitutes good dialogue. This 
includes, firstly, continued emphasis that dialogue is not concerned with one-way 
communication of policy outcomes that government already is pre-committed 
towards. Alternatively, good dialogue is presented as involving two-way or multi-way 
communication between publics, scientists and policymakers. In its guiding principles 
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for public engagement in science and technology, in a document called ‘The 
Government’s Approach to Public Dialogue on Science and Technology’ (BIS, 2009), 
there is explicit guidance that the scope of the dialogue process (i.e. the range of 
issues and policy options covered) must reflect the full range of aspirations and 
concerns held by publics, scientists and policy makers. This appeal for inclusiveness 
also pertains to the ways in which the dialogue is itself framed, which should be 
agreed, preferably through dialogue, such that it focuses on broad questions and a 
range of alternatives.  
This appeal for broadening the scope of dialogue responds to a body of academic 
literature that has called for the framing of technology appraisal (e.g. the choice of 
policy questions, the forming of hypotheses, the inclusion of disciplines, the 
treatment of uncertainties), to be opened up and subjected to public deliberation and 
scrutiny (Grove-White et al., 2000; Stirling, 1998; Wynne, 1992, 2006). This reflects 
international approaches and debates aimed at real-time technology assessment, 
constructive technology assessment and the anticipatory assessment of technology 
(see Barben et al., 2008; Guston & Sarewitz, 2002; Rip et al. 1995; Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution, 2008). Of course, while institutional rhetoric 
may have shifted, it is less clear that this change of emphasis has been carried out 
across the Sciencewise-ERC portfolio in practice. Some projects appear framed by 
tight and fairly specific policy questions and contexts (e.g. the Hybrids and Chimeras 
dialogue was tied to specific questions on the public acceptability of different types of 
embryo research) while other projects were carried out within a relatively traditional 
and largely one-way model of science communication (e.g. a framing assumption of 
the Industrial Biotechnology project was that the public lacked knowledge and were 
confused, and that the objective of the dialogue was to help build confidence in the 
government’s use, management and regulation of industrial biotechnology).  
Nevertheless, across the portfolio as a whole, it is clear that an effect of 
Sciencewise-ERC activity and guidance is a broadening of understanding of what 
constitutes deliberation, and of the acknowledged relevance and value of alternative 
perspectives. This point is especially pertinent given that the modus operandi of 
Sciencewise-ERC is one of co-sponsorship – a notable innovation of the initiative. 
With the exception of Science Horizons all dialogue projects have been co-produced, 
co-funded and co-delivered with external government bodies and agencies, and to a 
lesser extent with industry and the third sector (while the original remit of 
Sciencewise-ERC was wider than government, it was subsequently decided to 
narrow the focus to government departments, government agencies and non-
departmental public bodies). Organisations that have co-sponsored Sciencewise-
ERC dialogues currently include: agencies (Environment Agency, Food Standards 
Agency); departments (Defra, DECC); industry (British Telecom, Hewlett Packard, 
Unilever); learned academies (Academy of Medical Sciences); regulators 
(Environment Agency, HFEA); and research councils and funders of research 
(BBSRC, EPSRC, MRC, NERC, Nesta, Wellcome Trust). 
A second observation stems from how Sciencewise-ERC has performed a function 
as a corporate memory of public dialogue, with a repository of guidance notes and 
information on what constitutes good dialogue, alongside reports and evaluations of 
particular dialogue events. This has aided the professionalisation of public dialogue 
practice. Various notes and reports on best practice now include: how to make use of 
experts in public dialogue; how to work effectively with the media; how to widen 
public involvement and upscale public dialogue processes; how to improve the 
organisational use of dialogue through a Departmental Dialogue Index; how to 
understand, demonstrate and measure the value public dialogue; and how to enable 
and sustain citizen involvement over the life of a project and beyond. Through such 
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activity Sciencewise-ERC now arguably commands a leadership role in public 
engagement theory and practice. Indeed, while it is difficult to verify this claim it is 
difficult to locate a comparable institutionally-endorsed approach to public 
engagement in other Western democracies. This undoubtedly has contributed to 
increasing recognition from policy makers of the value, validity and legitimacy of 
public dialogue, such that it has become, for some, firmly woven into policy, 
normalised and embedded within decision-making processes. 
However, as Chilvers (2010) points out, the professionalisation of public engagement 
has created a new set of effects, tensions and questions. Chilvers identifies four 
effects: an increased separation and polarisation between academic social scientists 
and dialogue practitioners; a growing public engagement industry whose commercial 
interests can compromise democratic ideals of participation; an emphasis on a 
limited and homogenous set of techniques; and the favouring of top-down 
institutional framings of public dialogue. This raises questions about what we can 
learn from this dynamic and possible ways in which the democratic ideals of dialogue 
could be promoted. 
The third point of distinction concerns the methods that have been deployed in 
Sciencewise-ERC projects. Crudely, even though all Sciencewise-ERC projects aim 
towards a society in which the public, the broad science community and policy 
makers feel comfortable with the direction taken by science and technology, the 
range of methods used depend in part on three relatively distinct models of the 
implied relationship between public dialogue and the policy process. There are: 
• The Upstream Model – the aim of which is to develop a process through 
which publics can engage in complex conversations on the range of issues 
and questions posed by science and technology at a relatively early stage in 
the innovation process. 
• The Honest Broker Model – the aim of which is to deliberate on different 
policy options and to determine a preferred policy outcome, with justification. 
• The Issue Advocate Model – the aim of which is to deliberate on a shared 
policy goal, such as galvanising community-led participation in climate 
change, and to deliberate on the conditions under which this goal will be 
realised. 
The Upstream Model is the most challenging in terms of the methodological 
difficulties it poses and is discussed in some detail below. The challenges are for 
three reasons: (1) the science is at an early stage and it is unclear how the 
technology will develop and the extent to which its promises will be realised; (2) the 
subsequent social and ethical issues associated with the technology are uncertain as 
they depend on as yet to be realised innovation trajectories; and (3) the lay public is 
unfamiliar with the science and thus has no ready formed attitudes. Sciencewise-
ERC dialogues that have used the Upstream Model include Geoengineering, 
Industrial Biotechnology, Nanodialogues, Science Horizons and Synthetic Biology. 
The Upstream Model tests the limits of social science methodology, raising questions 
as to whether the conversation is simply too upstream for the methods to reflect 
reliably solid public opinion, and, if this is the case, whether the results and findings 
from the dialogues should be treated with caution in shaping future policy and 
decision making (for a version of this critique, see Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon, 
2007; for a response, see Macnaghten 2010). 
  
Notwithstanding the above debate, it is important to note that those Sciencewise-
ERC dialogue projects that have aimed to facilitate the upstream conversation have 
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been remarkably innovative in terms of methodology, particularly around the invited, 
selected and moderated small group discussion. Two influences are at work: (1) a 
tradition of policy-oriented academic research that uses small groups as a 
deliberative space where lay publics can share their experiences, values and 
knowledges and where social scientists can bring recognition of such local 
knowledge in the quest for making decision-making more reflexive and socially 
robust (for early examples of this approach, see Burgess et al., 1988a, 1988b; 
Burgess, 2005; Grove-White et al., 1997, 2000; Petts, 1997, 1999; Wynne, 1996); 
and (2) a market research tradition of using focus group methods to evaluate 
consumer preferences, attitudes and beliefs with a particular emphasis on how views 
and beliefs emerge in interaction with others. Reviewing the Sciencewise-ERC 
dialogue projects one can identify a remarkable range of group-based and bespoke 
deliberative methods. These include, inter alia, full day public workshops, citizens’ 
juries, citizens’ inquiries, reconvened deliberative groups, deliberative panels, 
national public conversations, self-managed group discussions, facilitated public 
events, regional workshops, outreach workshops, brainbox workshops, online 
consultation, blogs, and open access events, alongside non-deliberative interview, 
electronic voting and opinion poll survey techniques. In addition, there has been 
analogous innovation in the provision of stimulus material and expert opinion aimed 
at ensuring a reflective and informed discussion, typically provided in consultation 
with an Oversight Group.  
This innovation in deliberative methodology has emerged through creative interplay 
between market research methods, academic social science and independent 
facilitator on-the-ground experience, and bears witness to the dynamism and 
maturity of the ‘dialogue market’ (Chilvers, 2008; 2010). At its most creative it has 
enabled genuine discussion to take place on issues that are complex, unfamiliar and 
at times far-reaching. It has enabled insight into the structure of public concerns and 
aspirations, and into the values and aspirations that people bring to bear in 
developing their views. While the highly managed, carefully selected and closely 
choreographed small group discussion has become the method of choice for public 
dialogue, it is worth looking at six potential criticisms. These are: 
1. That this approach tends to be organised in the terms of the host decision-
making institution, which may neglect other, more uninvited, alternative 
framings on science-related issues (Chilvers, 2010). 
2. That the small group method tends to reinforce consensus and to 
homogenise views in ways that unwittingly irons outs differences and minority 
perspectives (Mohr, 2009). 
3. That the deliberative process can become overly structured by information, 
stimulus material, briefings, expert presentations, videos and so on, with 
insufficient time and space for participants to genuinely deliberate on the 
issues in their own terms (Mohr, 2009). 
4. That the selection of lay publics, defined as individuals who have no prior 
allegiance or connection to the issue at hand, tends to reproduce a stable and 
malleable image of ‘the public’ that is conducive to government control and 
management (Lezaun & Soneryd, 2007). 
5. That the sampling strategy, which tends to use standard demographic 
characteristics (i.e. age, class, gender) rather than topic-specific criteria, 
tends to generate weak group ties and shallow conversation given that the 
groups share little common experience and history. 
6. That the predominantly qualitative approach to methodology, while 
illuminative of the deeper reasonings and contextual understandings that 
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underpin public attitudes, is less equipped to identify attitudinal segmentation, 
including the relevance or otherwise of variables of class, age, education and 
knowledge. 
Models of public engagement 
In reviewing the 17 public dialogues on science and technology that Sciencewise-
ERC has sponsored since 2005, it is clear that different models of public 
engagement are being deployed that respond to different kinds of policy question. In 
Sciencewise-ERC’s resource library the dialogues are organised into priority areas of 
science and technology, as set out in the table below.  
Table of Sciencewise-ERC Dialogue Activity (by priority area) 
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Synthetic Biology X   X        
Industrial Biotechnology X           
Community X-Change X X  X  X     X 
Big Energy Shift  X          
Low Carbon Communities 
Challenge 
 X          
Geoengineering  X          
Energy 2050 Pathways  X          
Landscape and Ecosystem 
Futures 
  X         
Science Horizons     X    X   
Risky Business      X     X 
Animals containing Human 
Material 
      X     
Stem Cells       X     
Hybrids and Chimeras       X     
Drugsfutures       X     
Trustguide        X    
Forensic Use of DNA         X   
Nanodialogues          X X 
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The table above illustrates the diversity and reach of the Sciencewise-ERC public 
dialogues, each of which has been co-sponsored by a government department, 
agency, third-sector body or company (with the exception of Science Horizons) and 
has been subjected to independent evaluation. Using the typology of three models of 
the relationship between public dialogue and the policy process outlined above, we 
can redraw the table as below: 
Table of Sciencewise-ERC Dialogue Activity (by model of public engagement) 
 Upstream  Honest broker Issue advocate 
Synthetic Biology X   
Industrial Biotechnology X  X 
Community X-Change X  X 
Big Energy Shift   X 
Low Carbon Communities Challenge   X 
Geoengineering X X  
Energy 2050 Pathways   X 
Landscape and Ecosystem Futures  X  
Science Horizons X   
Risky Business   X 
Animals containing Human Material  X  
Stem Cells  X  
Hybrids and Chimeras  X  
Drugsfutures  X  
Trustguide   X 
Forensic Use of DNA  X  
Nanodialogues X   
 
This typology follows a set of distinctions developed by Roger Pielke in his book The 
Honest Broker in which he distinguishes between different models of scientific advice 
in the policy process (Pielke 2007). Developing this further, the Upstream Model is 
one that is used to open up public conversations about the social and ethical 
dimensions of science and technology at an early stage in the innovation trajectory. 
The conversations tend to be exploratory, to concern the ways in which the science 
and technology is being imagined by social actors, to scrutinise the views and visions 
of actors, to articulate the social and ethical issues, and to deliberate on the factors 
that shape concern, hope and possibility. Such dialogue events thus tend to be tied 
only loosely to specific policy goals and outcomes, and are more apt to offer generic 
advice on the governance of science and technology. 
Examples using the Upstream Model of public engagement include dialogue projects 
aimed at establishing views about the social and ethical issues raised by 1) specific 
areas of science and technology (Synthetic Biology, Nanodialogues, Industrial 
Biotechnology, Geoengineering), and 2) possible future directions in science in 
general (Science Horizons, Community X-Change). The Industrial Biotechnology and 
Community X-Change dialogues also fell into the Issue Advocate Model since the 
framing of both subscribe to a particular policy goal: that of building confidence in 
industrial biotechnology and that of providing a voice for local communities 
respectively. The Geoengineering dialogue also falls into the Honest Broker Model 
since the context in which the discussion took place related to a very specific policy 
question: that of whether, and under what conditions, geoengineering approaches 
have a role to play in tackling climate change. 
Dialogues that fall under the Honest Broker Model of public engagement alternatively 
were tied to a prescribed policy question or dilemma, and where the role of the public 
is to act as a lay ethical arbiter in providing views on how to proceed, weighing up the 
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pros and costs of different courses of action, articulating the conditions under which 
different options are acceptable or not, and thus helping inform a policy decision. 
This model of dialogue tends to be favoured for health-related questions, where the 
aim is one of helping sponsors to determine whether, and under what conditions, to 
fund and move forward with specific and ethically-challenging research (Animals 
containing Human Material, Hybrids and Chimeras, Stem Cells). A related category 
of dialogue relates to projects that seek to determine the effects of advances in the 
sciences on issues that already pose social problems and dilemmas (Drugsfutures) 
or that pose new dilemmas for the use and management of information (Forensic 
Use of DNA). The final example is tied to policy on future land use planning in the 
context of climate change (Landscape and ecosystem futures), and where the role of 
the dialogue was to understand values, benefits and trade-offs in relation to future 
land use scenarios.  
The Issue Advocate Model is the third category of public engagement. Dialogues 
subscribing to this model are characterised by adherence to a predetermined policy 
goal and where the aim of the dialogue is to develop new ways of achieving that goal 
through better understanding the views, beliefs and needs of publics. This model of 
dialogue is common in dialogues on climate change, responding to the policy goal of 
stimulating behaviour change as part of the government’s commitment to a legally 
binding target for greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Policy-derived questions 
shaping the various dialogues include: how to cut emissions at a local level (Low 
Carbon Communities Challenge), how to encourage people to change their energy 
behaviour (The Big Energy Shift), how to engage representatives of the public in 
local communities across the UK to run local deliberative dialogues (Energy 2050 
Pathways), how to increase awareness in students aged fourteen and over of issues 
of risk in science (Risky Business), and how to improve cyber trust (Trustguide). 
Common Themes and Challenges for Governance 
With the exception of Daniel Start’s (2010) review document there has been little 
attention drawn to the common themes that have emerged across the Sciencewise-
ERC dialogues or to their cumulative significance for questions of governance. In this 
section we examine key cross-cutting themes shared across multiple dialogues, and 
discuss their relevance and meaning in relation to wider public engagement literature 
and practice.  
The recent Department of Innovation, Universities and Skills/Research Councils UK 
(RCUK/DIUS) survey conducted in 2008 reported generally favourable public 
attitudes towards science in the UK (RCUK/DIUS 2008). It found that people are 
generally positive towards science, that this perception has increased compared to 
equivalent research conducted in 2000 and 2005, that almost all areas of scientific 
research presented to the public are seen as beneficial, that overall the public feels 
better informed about science than three years ago, and that concern about science 
and the speed of development has reduced since 2000 and 2005. The Sciencewise-
ERC dialogues reinforce this picture. Across the dialogues we are presented with a 
public which is generally positive, upbeat and excited about science, and about its 
transformative potential in delivering improvements to our everyday lives and to the 
environment. As Start (2010) sets out, this includes: (1) medical research to create 
new cures (Hybrid and Chimera; Stem Cells); (2) environmental and energy research 
to promote sustainability (Risky Business; Industrial Biotechnology; Big Energy Shift); 
(3) new technologies offering novel environmental solutions (Nanodialogues and 
Synthetic Biology); and (4) investment that consolidates Britain’s role as a leader in 
new science and technology (Stem Cells; Industrial Biotechnology)
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However, while public attitudes towards science and technology may be positive in 
general, they also depend on which technology sector is being discussed as well as 
on a set of wider contextual and attitudinal factors. The recent RCUK/DIUS survey, 
for example, highlights five distinct attitudinal groups – The Confident, The Sceptical 
Enthusiasts, The Less Confident, The Distrustful and The Indifferent – identified 
through cluster analysis, which are seen to account for most of the variance in 
respondents’ attitudes. More qualitative academic research has sought to clarify the 
factors that shape and structure attitudes of confidence and scepticism. The research 
suggests that public attitudes towards science cannot easily be segmented into those 
that are pro- and anti- science, and that wider contextual factors are relevant to 
understanding public views (for analysis of ambivalence in public risk research, see 
Grove-White et al., 1997; Kearnes and Wynne, 2007; Kearnes et al., 2006; 
Macnaghten and Urry, 1998). Five factors central to the structuring of public attitudes 
in the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues are discussed below. 
I. The purpose of science and technology 
A key factor shaping people’s attitudes towards science and technology concerned 
their assessment of the purpose of the science and of the motivations of those 
involved. In whose interests is the science being developed? Are particular 
innovations necessary? Are there alternatives?  
Medical and health technologies were seen by and large as driven by good 
purposes, including curing diseases, improving wellbeing and prolonging life. 
Research was thus accorded high importance, even when there were acknowledged 
ethical dilemmas. In the Synthetic Biology dialogue, for example, the motivations of 
scientists were deemed to be a key determinant in assuring acceptability: What is the 
purpose of your research? Why are you doing it? What are you going to gain? What 
else will it do? How do you know you are right? Given that the science was at an 
early stage, with clear potential for good and bad, ensuring that the science was 
conducted for good reasons (i.e. in response to societal needs rather than for short-
term gain or for knowledge for its own sake) was presented as a critical question. In 
the Stem Cells dialogue, support for further advances in the science was also seen 
as conditional on the purposes of the research and on whether it respects human 
values: Would it reflect public rather than solely commercial interests? Would it 
respect individual rights and autonomy? Was it focusing on serious diseases? Were 
people involved in decision-making processes? While in the Animals containing 
Human Material dialogue, support was similarly premised on the assumption that the 
aims of the research would be to improve human health or cure human diseases.  
The picture that emerges from the dialogues is that while there is general belief that 
science and scientists are motivated by the common good, supporting the findings of 
the 2008 RCUK/DIUS study, this level of trust depends on the science being seen as 
conducted for good reasons. These are whether the science is directed to societal 
rather than to commercial goals, with the goals of curing disease and improving 
health clearly the most favoured; and whether the science itself respects basic 
human values. 
 II. Trustworthiness of institutions 
Common across a number of dialogue projects was the finding that people 
surprisingly rarely trusted the motives of government to act in the public interest (Big 
Energy Shift, Geoengineering, Industrial Biotechnology, Science Horizons, Synthetic 
Biology, Trustguide). The notable exception was on health related dialogues where, 
alternatively, there appeared to be an underlying sense of trust and confidence in 
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regulation, oversight and the good intentions of government (Animals containing 
Human Material, Hybrids and Chimeras, Stem Cells). Such distrust is variously seen 
to stem from the questionable motives of business and the perceived inability of 
government to regulate them (Industrial Biotechnology), the lack of resources and 
effective coordination within government (NanoDialogues), and the inability to 
enforce effective policy on the ground (Forensic Uses of DNA). This distrust is 
apparent especially in domains where there is a perceived proximity between 
government and industry, most notably in agricultural and industrial biotechnology. 
As the report on the Industrial Biotechnology dialogue states: ‘Profit or anything 
associated with industry are viewed with great suspicion and there is little faith that 
the government will effectively resource the control and monitor[ing of] industry’ (p. 
4). Indeed, while the motives of scientists may be trusted, in general, the motives of 
government and industry are not. As Daniel Start comments in his review: “The initial 
public perception of government is of a regulatory structure that is weak and 
unreliable, vulnerable to private interests, and vulnerable to dangerous products 
slipping through the net” (Start, 2010: 20). 
Unfortunately there has been little analysis across the dialogue reports of the 
reasons that underpin such generic public distrust in government, or advice on what 
would constitute an appropriate governance response, aside from appeals for 
improved communication of benefits (Industrial Biotechnology); for regulation to 
develop an anticipatory and social intelligence capacity (Synthetic Biology); for more 
attention to be given to the equity effects of scientific and technological options 
(Geoengineering); and for more inclusive and systematic dialogue (various). A 
particular absence is an account of why science and technology has become a site 
for political mobilisation in some spheres (e.g biotechnology and food) and not others 
(health); of the reasons why government is seen as not to be trusted to monitor 
industry or look after the long-term; and of the need to differentiate between systemic 
as opposed to localised forms of mistrust. 
III. Feelings of powerlessness and exclusion 
In 1995, in a project on public perceptions and sustainability, Macnaghten et al. 
(1995) observed that the pronounced fatalism and cynicism that people expressed 
towards national and local government was a key barrier to environmental behaviour 
change. They further argued that attempts by government to galvanise community 
action would depend on their ability to develop relational mechanisms through which 
a sense of inclusion and shared purpose could be established. Ten to fifteen years 
later, and despite a heightened institutional rhetoric on inclusion, it is clear that many 
people still feel they are not included in deciding what kinds of public science and 
technology gets funded and in whose interests: i.e. they feel ‘kept in the dark’. This 
sense of powerlessness is expressed well in an extract from the Synthetic Biology 
dialogue report: 
“There was a strong sense that scientists are a closed community – while 
research was scrutinised by peers, it was hard to access by others. In part, this 
was because scientific expertise and knowledge of a field set them apart from 
others. However, it was also believed there was a cultural resistance to 
opening up science to the views and values of the public. This was particularly 
problematic as participants felt compelled to trust scientists, but ultimately felt 
powerless to have any control. As one participant noted:  ‘How can I stop a 
whole team of scientists doing something? I feel I can’t, I feel powerless.’ 
(Female, AB, 18-34)” 
(Synthetic Biology 2010: 41) 
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Similar views were expressed in the Industrial Biotechnology dialogue, where 
participants felt that government/industry would dictate change with little power for 
consumer choice; in the Big Energy Shift dialogue where the need for a bold and 
overarching narrative from government was presented as the single biggest 
determinant in shifting energy behaviour; and in the Nanodialogues where one 
participant commented, tongue in cheek, on the peculiarity of the dialogue process: “I 
feel lucky, I feel like we can make some nanoscule contribution to society”. 
More positive were a number of overlapping suggestions for increased citizen 
participation and engagement. At the downstream end, where products and 
technologies are already in the marketplace, came suggestions for the provision of 
improved, balanced and honest information: on harms (Drugsfutures); on rights 
(Forensic Uses of DNA); and on the provision of guarantees in the event of mishaps 
(Trustguide). With both upstream and downstream science came calls for investment 
in risk and safety research: on effective governance and quality control procedures 
(Stem Cells); on long-term monitoring for unpredictable effects (Nanodialogues); and 
on the containment, control and governance of biotechnology risks (Industrial 
Biotechnology; Synthetic Biology). At the more upstream end, where the risks of the 
technology were uncertain and less understood, were calls for more open discussion 
of the uncertainties in the science and their potential effects: within the medical 
establishment (Drugsfutures), the judiciary (Forensic Uses of DNA), and companies 
(Industrial Biotechnology). A common theme was the call for a change in the culture 
of science that would encourage scientists to voice concerns over potential risks and 
uncertainties, and to reflect on wider social and ethical considerations. In the 
Synthetic Biology dialogue, participants questioned whether a dominant culture of 
science existed – one which emphasised curiosity-driven, basic research, coupled 
with a publish or perish mindset – which had the effect of unwittingly encouraging 
scientists to focus unduly on the positive outcomes of the science, and to miss the 
potential risks. Similarly, in the Stem Cell dialogue report, it is stated that: 
“Future dialogue should focus on the cultures and practices of research within 
institutions. Whilst large structured dialogue events are important, it will be 
fundamental that the everyday practice and discussion of science is mindful of 
societal views. Uncertainties in stem cell science should be communicated 
openly if the public debate is to avoid being dominated by hype.” 
(Stem Cells 2007: ix) 
 
IV. Speed and direction of science and innovation 
A long-standing public concern with science and technology is that research and 
innovation processes are being developed at a speed that exceeds their scope for 
ethical and regulatory oversight and that, alternatively, we should proceed with 
caution (for recent survey results on concerns over ‘speed’, see RCUK/DIUS 2008; 
see also Bingham, 2008; Stengers, 2000). There is a further and additional concern, 
with the direction science is taking us and whether this has been adequately 
considered and agreed (Stirling, 2007). Alternatively, it is proposed that we should be 
careful in promoting risky science that may create new dangers and dilemmas until 
we are better satisfied that the issues posed by current science and technology are 
resolved. Although a concern with the speed of scientific innovation was less evident 
in the 2008 RCUK/DIUS survey than in the 2000 survey, concerns of this kind were 
still commonplace across the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues. Examples can be seen in 
the Stem Cells dialogue (was research being pushed to deliver applications too 
soon?), and in the Synthetic Biology dialogue (what were the dangers of speeding up 
natural and evolutionary processes?).  
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Concerns were also voiced on the direction in which science is taking us. These 
extended beyond matters of safety and technical risk to a broader set of social and 
ethical issues that included: concerns over unforeseen consequences including 
controllability and reversibility (Geoengineering, Synthetic Biology); impacts on 
perceived naturalness (Geoengineering, Synthetic Biology); and impacts in terms of 
fairness and equity (Geoengineering). As the Nanodialogues report commented: 
“Safety was a sideshow. The real concern was with where companies are taking us” 
(page 63). The analysis undertaken in the reporting of the Science Horizons dialogue 
is insightful in this respect. It suggests that public views on future science and 
technology will be determined not simply on the benefits and risks of the particular 
technologies, but through the extent to which they respond to ‘social goods’, namely: 
• Better health (a social good) 
• Independence, especially for the elderly (a social good) 
• Convenience (a social good) 
• Quality of life (a social good) 
• Risks to safety (a social bad) 
• Scope for loss of privacy and autonomy (a social bad) 
• Social divisiveness (a social bad) 
• Lack of genuine human interaction (a social bad) 
While each of the above points requires further differentiation and expansion, it 
nevertheless reinforces the observation that public views on science and technology 
depend critically on their ‘social constitution’, that is on the distinctive values and 
social assumptions that are embedded in their development (Grove-White et al., 
2000). 
V. Ethics, trade-offs and the social distribution of risks and benefits 
A final theme concerns commonalities in lay ethical judgment. Daniel Start (2010), in 
his review of the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues, usefully observes that differences of 
ethical opinion tended to be most pronounced within the dialogues rather than 
between them. A primary consideration was whether there was a sense of genuine 
social benefit from publicly-funded science. At an individual level, where the social 
benefit was high, the public was prepared to accept higher tradeoffs. Thus, in the 
Stem Cell dialogue, stem cell research was seen as acceptable only in cases where 
there existed the potential for very significant medical breakthroughs for the 
treatment of incurable diseases. In cases where stem cells were proposed in 
cosmetic applications or for the purposes of human enhancement, where the social 
benefit was seen as low, the research was seen as less acceptable. 
A secondary consideration was the social distribution of those costs and benefits. 
Across many of the dialogues was a concern that the political economy of new 
science and technology would disproportionally impact upon vulnerable groups, 
particularly the poor, the ill, the unborn and those unable to defend themselves. 
Concern was expressed that nanotechnologies would benefit the rich and the 
powerful, not the poor or the unemployed (Nanodialogues); that medical research 
would be biased towards western and affluent illnesses rather than those in 
developing countries (Stem Cells); that the National DNA database could be used by 
governments to further discriminate against ethnic minorities (Forensic Uses of 
DNA); while the use of new drug treatments in the management of mental health 
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conditions could be seen as a cheap alternative to social and behavioural therapy 
(Drugsfutures). 
A final consideration was the differing and competing philosophical perspectives that 
people used to discuss the ethics of particular scientific and technological 
innovations. Start (2010) distinguishes two competing philosophies at work in the 
dialogues: a liberal and individualistic set of values and rights pitted against 
communitarian and collective values and virtues. Thus, while people were in general 
positive about the prospects of new technology for improving convenience, saving 
time and adding choice (appealing to liberal and individualistic values), at the same 
time they were wary that those same technologies would erode communities, 
devalue traditions and dehumanise relationships (Science Horizons). While there 
was strong concern about the perils of inappropriate drug use from a collective 
viewpoint, there was at the same time a widespread view that individuals should 
have the right to make their own decisions (DrugFutures). While there was strong 
support for the use of science and technology to aid national security, the public also 
spoke up for rights to privacy and anonymity (Forensic Uses of DNA). 
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Chapter 3:  MAPPING SCIENCE 
GOVERNANCE RESPONSES  
In this chapter we shift the review from a focus on the governance issues and 
concerns stated across invited public dialogues to consider the ways in which 
science and policy institutions are responding to governance challenges in emerging 
and complex areas of science, technology and innovation – namely genomics, 
nanotechnology and climate science.4 The intention is to provide an indication of the 
range of governance responses rather than a comprehensive review. In so doing, the 
emphasis is on mapping the range of actual and possible responses rather than 
making links to the particular public dialogues reviewed in Chapter 2. The 
governance responses forming part of the review cover two main categories. The 
first is the routes through which publics can have influence in shaping the nature and 
direction of emerging science and technology (including its priorities, objectives and 
strategies), such as through formal invited public engagement and dialogue, 
‘uninvited’ spaces of engagement, forms of open innovation, crowdsourcing and co-
design, and other means of understanding public views and wider ‘social 
intelligence’. The second concerns the mechanisms for public transparency, scrutiny, 
oversight, accountability and quality control (including responsible innovation, 
voluntary codes of conduct, moves to open data, lay advisory panels/members, peer 
review processes, institutional design). In order to cover a diversity of governance 
responses in each area of science and technology, and to contextualise the analysis 
of the Sciencewise-ERC dialogues in Chapter 2, we draw on international as well as 
UK examples. 
Genomics 
The field of genomics focuses on the characterisation and sequencing of the genome 
and the analysis of the relationship between gene activity and cell function. Rooted in 
the foundational work of the Human Genome Project (HGP), it has become a varied 
field covering areas as diverse as DNA profiling, plant and animal genetics, personal 
genomics, embryonic stem cell research, and synthetic biology. While these scientific 
and technological developments offer potential benefits, such as advances in health 
care, regenerative medicine, agriculture, and energy production, they also raise 
intense ethical and social concerns, uncertainties, and public unease. The significant 
governance challenges raised by this are further intensified by the rapid evolution of 
genomics science and technologies, their global connectedness, and the increasingly 
powerful role of the genomics industry and corporate interests.  
In many industrialised nations the governance of genomics has shifted from a largely 
centralised approach based on top-down government regulation in the 1970s and 
1980s, towards a more distributed system of networked governance since the 1990s 
where the direction and governance of genomics-related research is also influenced 
by multiple actors in industry and civil society (Rhodes, 1997; Gottweis, 2005). What 
we are now seeing is a ‘governance continuum’ with multiple genomics governance 
responses, where state-led regulation coexists with more participative forms of 
policy-making (Lyall, 2007). The latter is being promoted by principles of ‘responsible 
governance’, such as those espoused in the European Commission’s Strategy for 
                                                        
4
 These areas have been selected because they represent distinct science governance contexts offering 
a diverse range of governance responses and because they closely link with the proposed case study 
areas to be taken forward in Phase 2 of the BIS/Sciencewise-ERC ‘Science, Trust and Public 
Engagement’ project.  
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Life Science and Biotechnology (European Commission, 2007), which seeks to 
combine goals of ethical and social responsibility with science-based regulatory 
oversight. Gottweis (2005) summarises this range of genomics governance 
responses as including: 
• Top-down regulation as traditionally deployed by governments or 
governmental institutions;  
• Bottom-up patterns of governance, where genomics-related policy-making is 
shaped through inputs from companies, or more general mass publics and 
public opinion; 
• Multidirectional forms of genomics governance involving interactions and 
patterns of negotiation between governments, NGOs and business alliances;  
• New forms of self-governance, as articulated by the rise of new actors such 
as patient groups or self-help organisations. 
In the late 1990s, rising public concerns over the application of genomics-related 
technologies (such as GM crops), expressions of uncertainty, and attempts to regain 
public trust in the wake of the BSE crisis, led to a number of UK institutional 
innovations. In genomics-related areas three independent advisory bodies were set 
up at arm’s length from government, all with expertise and remits to consider the 
social and ethical implications of genomics technologies, with stated commitments to 
transparency and openness, and requirements for public input (Grove-White, 2001). 
The Human Genetics Commission was set up by the UK government in 1999, 
comprising experts in genetics, ethics, law and consumer affairs, to provide advice 
on the social, ethical and legal issues associated with human genetics and its 
impacts on people and health care. It can be seen as indicative of the worldwide 
drive to develop ethical expertise and ethics bodies in the genomics field. The Food 
Standards Agency (FSA), an independent government department, was set up a 
year later to protect the public's health and consumer interests in relation to food, 
with parallel advisory responsibilities relating to GM foods. A further body, the 
Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was established in 
2000 to provide strategic advice on biotechnology issues affecting agriculture and the 
environment until it was wound up in 2005. 
The design of these bodies has involved a number of governance mechanisms to 
address issues of expertise, transparency, openness and public scrutiny, including: 
• Independence: The HGC and AEBC were constituted as independent advisory 
bodies, while the FSA was set up as a non-ministerial government department 
charged with protecting consumer interests in relation to food safety and 
standards. 
• A diverse membership: Each body included expertise that extended beyond 
immediate areas of scientific expertise, to include lawyers, social scientists, 
philosophers, ethicists, and representatives from industry and civil society 
organisations.   
• A commitment to openness and transparency: Meetings tended to be held in 
public (AEBC and FSA), and bodies have been committed to openly publishing 
minutes, reports, and decision points on the web. 
• Mechanisms for embedded public scrutiny and representation: Each body has 
attempted to embed public scrutiny within the internal workings of the advisory 
process: for example, the FSA includes at least one lay member on each of its 
ten advisory committees, while the HGC has set up a consultative panel made up 
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of over 100 people with direct experience of living with genetic disorders to 
provide feedback on reports and decision recommendations. 
A dominant governance response of these UK advisory bodies, reflected also in 
parallel genomics-related science and policy institutions in other Western countries, 
has been to develop formal invited public dialogues as a way of eliciting public views 
and concerns over genomics developments, often on a one-off basis relating to key 
decision points or policy-making processes. The AEBC led the GM Nation? national 
consultation on the commercialisation of GM crops in the UK in 2003 (Horlick-Jones 
et al. 2007); the FSA held its own public dialogue processes on GM food in the same 
year to link with the government’s wider public debate on GM (FSA, 2003); while the 
HGC has run a number of consultations including the Sciencewise-ERC sponsored 
Citizens’ Inquiry into the forensic use of genetic information in 2008 (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). Although a range of stakeholders and affected publics have been 
involved in certain processes, the emphasis has been on representing the general 
public, on engaging ‘innocent citizens’, and on using deliberation for the purpose of 
knowledge extraction for policy decision-making (similar trends have been examined 
by Braun and Schultz (2010) in a survey of participatory governance arrangements in 
the area of genetic testing in Germany and the UK). 
In contrast to this governance response format there are increasing moves towards 
more distributed forms of innovation and public interaction with genomics research, 
including open innovation and crowdsourcing. This can be seen, for example, in 
recent developments in personal genomics. Over the last two or three years, 
commercial companies have rapidly extended the provision of direct-to-consumer 
genome testing, designed to provide the public with their own genomic information. 
Crowdsourcing is a further technique through which patient and online communities 
can contribute their information directly to large research datasets (Prainsack and 
Wolinsky, 2010). Supporters of this model of patient-driven research see it as the 
“democratization of research and say they are pioneering new models that put 
patients in control of their data and build bridges between researchers, patients and 
their doctors” (Arnquist, 2009). The personal genomics company 23andMe is 
pioneering this new approach where customers purchase a genome scan but are 
also encouraged to upload phenotypic information and lifestyle data to a larger data 
pool for their own commercial purposes. Other ventures, such as the Personal 
Genome Project (www.personalgenomes.org), are using crowdsourcing as a 
technique for participant enrollment, but also use open-sourcing to share the data 
generated from these participants in an open format.  
Many more forms of open innovation and collaboration are taking shape in genomics 
research, often initiated by scientists, industry, or collectives of actors on open 
platforms (further examples include Open Source Drug Discovery 
(www.osdd.net/home) which fosters collaboration around genomics and 
computational technologies; and diybio (www.diybio.org) a community for do-it-
yourself biologists). In the scientific literature at least (e.g. Ekins & Williams, 2010) 
the rationales for such governance responses are focused on efficiency-based 
arguments and knowledge gains through pooling ideas and data. Some go as far as 
claiming that the rise of “personal genomics companies offering online whole 
genome scanning services seems to have made a quantum leap in the 
democratization of genomic knowledge” (Knoppers, 2009: 378). Yet in the main 
these appear largely extractive ‘citizen science’ exercises where the data is not then 
made available in a public way that can empower citizens or allow them potentials to 
challenge the directions and governance practices of genomics research. There 
remain, in addition, concerns over issues of data protection, anonymity, and 
participatory ethics. The handling of these concerns, and potentials for public 
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involvement in governance responses, is much more developed in many national 
and international biobank initiatives (Gottweis & Lauss, 2010), including professional 
codes of conduct and additional governance responses in the form of independent 
oversight structures (Wallace et al., 2008). 
Different forms of participation are enacted in uninvited spaces of engagement, not 
least forms of activism and protest, and these have long been associated with 
genomics-based science and technologies. The response of science and policy 
institutions to these alternative spaces of engagement is often one of denial, 
although such forms of representation have arguably had an indirect influence in 
prompting the above-explained institutional changes that took place in relation to the 
governance of agricultural biotechnology through the late 1990s. In taking a longer-
term view on the role and dynamics of uninvited engagement in the agricultural 
biotechnology arena, Wynne has recently traced how public opposition to GMOs and 
uninvited public engagement played a largely indirect role in reorientating UK plant 
and crop science research strategies from a narrow vision concentrated on GM to a 
more holistic, diverse and flexible portfolio that now includes non-GM approaches to 
crop improvement (Wynne, 2010; Doubleday & Wynne, in press). This occurred 
through the UK Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) 
and other scientific actors reflecting on the reasons for public opposition, and 
became evident in the BBSRC’s 2004 Crop Science Review with its emphasis on 
‘public-good’ plant breeding. Such forms of influence remain an open question, but 
they do raise critical issues about the ability of science and policy institutions to 
acknowledge and listen to the uninvited voice (as well as reflect on their own 
scientific institutional cultures).  
Nanotechnology  
It is inevitable that concerns about the social, ethical and environmental implications 
of nanotechnology have been shaped by past experiences relating to the introduction 
of new and emerging technologies. In particular, the initial drive towards upstream 
public engagement in nanotechnology was at least in part fuelled by a desire to learn 
lessons from the experience of GM crops in Europe, where arguably there had been 
a failure to recognise public concerns about the development of these technologies 
until after public resistance to their commercialisation had solidified (Kearnes et al., 
2006). In this sense, nanotechnology has been represented as an opportunity to gain 
public input and explore social and ethical implications much earlier on in the 
innovation process, when it is still possible to shape the development of the 
emerging technology (Macnaghten et al., 2005).  
Nanotechnology has also been viewed by social scientists and others as an 
opportunity to move the debate from a narrow focus on risk governance, where the 
questions are reduced to ones of risk and safety, to ‘innovation governance’ (Felt & 
Wynne, 2007), which emphasises ‘upstream questions’ of the sort routinely raised by 
publics in dialogues (see Chapter 2), such as: “Why this technology? Why not 
another? Who needs it? Who is controlling it? Who benefits from it? To what ends 
will it be directed?” (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). The hope was, and still is, to deepen 
reflection and debate about human needs and purposes associated with emerging 
areas of science, technology, and innovation (Kearnes et al., 2006).  
These questions have driven a set of initiatives aimed at the upstream engagement 
of nanotechnologies and the development of governance responses. The dominant 
response from science and policy institutions, at least in the early stages, has been 
to orchestrate managed spaces of small-scale public deliberation, and citizen-
scientist interaction, to negotiate the social and ethical implications of emerging 
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nanotechnologies. Examples of this format include: the Sciencewise-ERC sponsored 
Nanodialogues project (see Chapter 2) (Stilgoe, 2007); the ESRC-funded project 
Nanotechnology, risk and sustainability (Kearnes et al., 2006); the Nanotechnology 
for Healthcare public dialogue (BMRB, 2008); the NanoJury UK project (Gavelin et 
al. 2007); the Copus-funded Small Talk project (Gavelin et al. 2007); and the 
Wellcome Trust funded project Democs (Gavelin et al. 2007). Parallel and 
complementary responses can be identified across Europe and North America. The 
EU FP7 NANOPLAT project has surveyed a number of these deliberative process on 
emerging nanotechnologies across Europe (Stø et al. 2010), which mainly take the 
form of heavily engineered spaces of public deliberation involving ‘innocent citizens’. 
 
A further nanotechnology governance response, initiated to a large extent by the 
social scientific research community, has been the development of integrated 
systems of ‘real-time technology assessment’ (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002) and 
‘anticipatory governance’ (Barben et al 2008), as demonstrated in the work of the 
Centre for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University. Here forms of 
public engagement and dialogue such as those noted above, foresight practices, and 
reflexive collaboration between natural and social scientists are brought together in a 
comprehensive framework. This offers an integrated and systematic approach to 
building in continuous reflection on the social and ethical implication of 
nanotechnologies as they are being developed. It also highlights the importance of 
encouraging and building the capacity of nanoscientists in the laboratory to enact 
such reflection themselves with the help of, and in collaboration with, social scientists 
(Doubleday, 2007).  
These largely discrete and contained experiments have led recently to institutional 
responses that are beginning to consider the wider governance system, and that 
seek to bring about the responsible development of nanotechnologies through more 
distributed and self-regulated means. This includes: (1) voluntary reporting schemes, 
such as the Voluntary Reporting Scheme for Engineered Nanoscale Materials 
developed by Defra as a mechanism for building evidence on possible risks; and (2) 
voluntary codes of conduct and emerging mechanisms aimed at the responsible 
development of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. In the UK, the Royal Society, 
Insight Investment and the Nanotechnology Industries Association (NIA), developed 
the Responsible NanoCode, aimed at ensuring responsible practice. At the 
European level, a Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and 
Nanotechnologies Research has been developed, based on seven underlying 
principles: meaning, sustainability, precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation 
and accountability (European Commission 2008). The principles are defined below. 
• Meaning: N&N research activities should be comprehensible to the public. 
They should respect fundamental rights and be conducted in the interest of 
the well-being of individuals and society in their design, implementation, 
dissemination and use. 
• Sustainability: N&N research activities should be safe, ethical and contribute 
to sustainable development serving the sustainability objectives of the 
Community as well as contributing to the United Nations' Millennium 
Development Goals. They should not harm or create a biological, physical or 
moral threat to people, animals, plants or the environment, at present or in the 
future. 
• Precaution: N&N research activities should be conducted in accordance with 
the precautionary principle, anticipating potential environmental, health and 
safety impacts of N&N outcomes and taking due precautions, proportional to 
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the level of protection, while encouraging progress for the benefit of society 
and the environment. 
• Inclusiveness: Governance of N&N research activities should be guided by 
the principles of openness to all stakeholders, transparency and respect for 
the legitimate right of access to information. It should allow the participation in 
decision-making processes of all stakeholders involved in or concerned by 
N&N research activities. 
• Excellence: N&N research activities should meet the best scientific standards, 
including standards underpinning the integrity of research and standards 
relating to Good Laboratory Practices. 
• Innovation: Governance of N&N research activities should encourage 
maximum creativity, flexibility and planning ability for innovation and growth. 
• Accountability: Researchers and research organisations should remain 
accountable for the social, environmental and human health impacts that their 
N&N research may impose on present and future generations. 
Innovative experiments in responsible innovation are now underway within particular 
institutional contexts, such as the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research 
Council’s (EPSRC) Nanotechnologies Grand Challenge for Environmental Solutions, 
which has trialled new anticipatory risk governance approaches in the form of risk 
registers. The research programme, on the use of nanoscience for carbon capture 
and utilisation, asked applicants to submit a ‘risk register’ to accompany the 
application, aimed at identifying the wider potential impacts (social, environmental, 
ethical) of their proposed research (Owen and Goldberg, 2010). Although applicant 
responses tended to focus conservatively on considerations of technical risk, either 
to the environment or to human health, rather than a consideration of broader 
societal issues and effects, this was not always the case. A minority of bids did 
address wider social and ethical aspects through building multidisciplinary teams that 
included social scientific expertise; the adoption of frameworks of real time 
technology assessment; and building public and stakeholder engagement into the 
research design (Owen and Goldberg, 2010). 
While the above initiatives point to a new governance landscape, the extent to which 
they have impacted on institutional culture is less clear: the Defra Voluntary 
Reporting Scheme had only limited take-up; the European Code of Conduct has 
reportedly been met with resistance by various Member States; the UK Responsible 
NanoCode has been dormant for a couple of years; and so on (for wider analysis see 
Davies at al., 2009). Nevertheless, these initiatives suggest an important rhetorical 
shift in policy rhetoric towards anticipation and responsibility, accompanied by 
institutional moves aimed at considering the wider ethical and social dimensions of 
nanotechnology earlier on in the innovation process. 
Climate science  
Ever since the earliest stages in the formation of international action on climate 
change, the framing of the debate has been dominated by climate science, which 
has assumed a linear relation to policy development (Pielke, 2010). This has shaped 
the governance of climate science, with appeals to scientific consensus seen as 
central to the policy goal of promoting action, and through a largely distant 
relationship between climate science and society, with interaction mainly occurring 
through the media. 
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This seemingly cosy relationship between climate science, policy and society has 
been shaken over the past year in the wake of the UEA hacked emails affair and 
questioning of the impartiality, accuracy and balance of IPCC scientific assessments. 
Recent events have led, in certain instances and in conjunction with other factors, to 
increasing public scrutiny and an erosion of public trust in climate science. Ongoing 
developments in the governance of climate science have been brought to a head and 
in some cases accelerated post-‘Climategate’, potentially providing an opportunity to 
reconfigure the climate science-policy relationship and leading to a new wave of 
governance responses both in the UK and internationally.  
The possible nature and scale of these responses has been indicated in a series of 
reviews and independent inquiries. For example, recommendations from the Muir 
Russell independent review into the UEA hacked emails emphasise the need for 
openness and transparency in relation to climate science, models and data, as well 
as improvements in communication, peer review processes, and the handling of 
uncertainties in climate science (Russell et al. 2010). Similarly, recommendations 
from the InterAcademy Council’s recent international review of climate change 
assessments focus on the IPCC’s governance and management, including its review 
process, characterisation and communication of uncertainty, communications, and 
transparency in the assessment process (InterAcademy Council, 2010).  
In addition to moves to improve the communication of climate science both in terms 
of how scientists relate to non-scientific audiences and the handling of uncertainties, 
the most widespread and high profile responses have been initiatives to open up 
climate science data and codes (Kleiner, 2011). A number of open data projects 
have been initiated, including a JISC-funded project being carried out by the Climatic 
Research Unit at UEA, in partnership with the Science and Technology Facilities 
Council (STFC) e-Science Centre. Another significant development has been 
initiatives to open up the codes that underpin climate change models to wider access 
by scientists and non-scientists, such as work by The Climate Code Foundation 
which is seeking to rebuild “trust and support [in climate science and policy], by 
improving the transparency and communication of the science, and especially the 
software used in the science” (The Climate Code Foundation, 2010). 
There is no doubt that recent events are leading to changes in the practice and 
governance of climate science. As the Muir Russell review team state: “Like it or not, 
this indicates a transformation in the way science has to be conducted in this 
century” (Russell et al. 2010: para 36). But what is the nature and extent of change 
needed to properly address the issue of waning public trust in climate science? Is it 
enough to enhance climate science communication and to open up data as reflected 
in the dominant response to the crisis so far? Although constructive and necessary, 
such moves are science-centred and arguably leave the dominant framing of climate 
change, and the linear relationship between climate science and policy/action (as 
outlined above), untouched.  
A collective of leading thinkers on climate change from the sciences and humanities 
have recently argued for a more radical reframing of climate science and policy in 
The Hartwell Paper: A new direction for climate policy after the crash of 2009 (Prins 
et al. 2010). The group suggest that the popular view of science, which assumes a 
linear relationship between climate science and policy and adherence to a ‘deficit 
model’ (Wynne, 1991) where communicating more information in more effective 
ways is expected to enhance public trust and pro-environmental action, represents a 
misunderstanding of the science of earth systems. They suggest it is based on a  
 
“...flawed assumption that the solutions to climate change should be ‘science 
driven’ as if a shared understanding of science will lead to a political 
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consensus. Rather, as we have seen, the diverse political framings reveal 
themselves in alternative views of science. The consequence is that debates 
about climate politics are then waged in the guise of debates about science, 
to the detriment of both” (Prins et al. 2010: 17-18). 
 
The Hartwell Paper calls for a more humble and practical way of thinking about 
climate science that acknowledges the multiple framings inherent to debate on 
climate change (Hulme, 2009), and the role of value-judgements including their 
relation to science (Pielke, 2007), which need to be opened up to democratic 
deliberation. The group argue that the framing of the climate issue needs to be 
inverted: from a focus on sin to that of human dignity; from viewing climate change 
as a conventional tractable environmental problem to understanding it as a persistent 
condition that must be coped with; and from seeing ‘climate policy’ as a single, target 
driven, coherent and enforceable thing under which multiple issues reside to one 
where “multiple framings and agendas are pursued in their own right, and according 
to their own logics and along their own appropriate paths” (Prins et al., 2010: 10). 
 
In short, it is suggested that the restoration of trust in expert organisations depends 
on a radical reframing and reconfiguration of the relationship between climate 
science, climate policy and societal change. In addition to practical changes relating 
to three overarching objectives, this reframing can be seen as involving recognition 
that “to be validated, knowledge must also be subject to the scrutiny of an extended 
community of citizens who have legitimate stakes in the significance of what is being 
claimed” (Hulme & Ravetz, 2009). The significance of this is further emphasised by 
debates over the credentials of traditional forms of peer-review following recent 
climate science controversies. Possible governance responses include widening 
representation on expert committees, scientists engaging in discussions on the 
blogosphere, through to opening mechanisms of extended peer review. Beyond this, 
responses could take the form of co-produced forms of knowledge production with 
climate scientists working in collaboration with social scientists and non-scientists; 
upstream public engagement on climate change related technologies (such as the 
case of geoengineering discussed in Chapter 2); the contribution of expertise and 
insights from non-scientific disciplines in the arts and humanities; distributed forms of 
climate science; and recognition that other knowledges and ways of living with and 
acting on climate change are a necessary part of the innovations needed to form a 
low-carbon future. 
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Chapter 4:  SYNTHESIS AND 
CONCLUSIONS  
Our review of the science governance issues emerging from Sciencewise-ERC 
sponsored public dialogues in Chapter 2 identifies five main themes that capture the 
crosscutting features of public concern on the governance of science.  
1. The purpose of science and technology. Across a number of dialogue 
projects people expressed considerable ambivalence towards science, 
technology and innovation. A key issue that underpins their ambivalence 
was their concern with the purpose of science and technology and with 
the underlying motivations of scientists. What are the motivations for the 
science? Whose interests are they serving? Is it necessary? Is there a 
clear rationale? Are there alternatives?  
2. Trustworthiness of institutions. A second issue relates to the relative lack 
of trust in government to act in the public interest. While this differs across 
science and technology areas – such as between health and food – key 
issues relate to the perceived proximity between government and the 
interests of industry, how relationships between them are governed and 
how trustworthiness is earned or developed.  
3. Feelings of powerlessness and exclusion. Third, people tend to feel that 
they are not included in deciding what kinds of science and technology 
get funded, and feel they are ‘kept in the dark’. They also express a desire 
to feed their values and aspirations into the science and innovation 
process.  
4. Speed and direction of science and innovation. The fourth theme relates 
to the speed of research and innovation. Specifically, that the pace of 
scientific and technological development exceeds its scope for ethical and 
regulatory oversight and that it may take us in directions that have not 
been adequately considered. These concerns raise questions about how 
regulatory frameworks can become more flexible and adaptive in order to 
keep up with the new directions science may take us. 
5. Ethics and the culture of science. Finally, people were concerned with 
whether the culture of science discourages scientists from voicing 
concerns over potential risks and uncertainties, or to reflect on wider 
social and ethical considerations. Key issues include how organisational 
culture encourages, or not, discussion, reflection and communication of 
these dimensions of science and technology. 
A brief mapping of governance responses across three distinct science and 
technology areas in Chapter 3 suggests the following trends. 
• An identifiable move to go beyond formal deliberative processes – which 
remain a dominant and important governance mechanism – towards a 
more diverse range of ways in which scientists and institutions can be 
exposed to public issues. These range from moves to understand 
perspectives emerging from ‘uninvited engagement spaces’ (such as the 
blogosphere) and various forms of outreach, knowledge transfer and 
exchange, through to crowdsourcing and data mining.  
• Governance responses associated with more distributed and open forms 
of innovation – such as opensourcing, crowdsourcing, and co-design – 
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are rapidly emerging and hold much potential. In some instances 
questions remain over whether they are merely extractive processes or 
whether they offer the public a genuine role in shaping the framing, 
direction and governance of particular scientific and technological 
innovation. 
• Explicit commitments to institutional redesign towards openness, 
transparency, and accountability. Such innovations, which were evident in 
the governance of genomics-related issues during the late 1990s, have 
recently come to the fore in the climate change context. The dynamic 
through which change materialises in practice raises questions about the 
role of public resistance and controversy in mediating governance 
responses. 
• The development of voluntary codes of conduct as an alternative to purely 
regulatory or top-down audit practices is evident, although the 
effectiveness of this change remains unclear. The emphasis of voluntary 
mechanisms on communication and education in relation to codes of 
conduct – rather than supporting their implementation through changes to 
infrastructure or the research environment – has potentially slowed their 
uptake. 
• In attempting to map the diversity of governance responses in this review 
the relative emphasis has leant towards those that are novel and 
emergent. It is worth noting that there are a number of more established 
governance mechanisms evident in these science and technology areas – 
such as ethical codes of conduct (e.g. the Universal Ethical Code for 
Scientists), ethics review committees and public engagement 
mechanisms, alongside training and culture change programmes that 
seek to build capacity in these aforementioned areas.5  
It has not been our intention to trace direct causal connections between the 
governance concerns emerging from particular public dialogues analysed in Chapter 
2 and the governance responses reviewed in Chapter 3. We are able to make some 
general observations at this point, however, that while some of the governance 
issues identified in Chapter 2 are at least partly responded to in governance 
practices (concerns about inclusion for example) others are not so evident (such as 
concerns over the purposes of emerging science and technology). For instance, in 
the case of nanotechnology, upstream questions relating to human needs and 
purposes are often reduced to ones of risk and impacts in actual governance 
practice. The emphasis on human health risk to researchers and omission of social 
implications in responses to EPSRC’s risk register is just one example.  
The influences at play here and the processes of institutional response are clearly 
complex and have been ‘blackboxed’ to some extent in past social scientific 
research. In order to understand these complexities it is important to adopt a 
grounded research strategy based on an in-depth qualitative approach that openly 
allows competing explanations to emerge. Having said this, the following issues 
should be examined or acknowledged in any inquiry that seeks to understand how 
institutions and governance systems respond to public concerns. 
• An explicitly sociological and contextual approach – as adopted in this 
review – can offer an understanding of governance responses in the 
context of a complex interplay of multiple actors, intermediaries and 
                                                        
5
 Recommendations and actions in these areas have been outlined in the March 2010 report of the BIS 
Science and Trust Expert Group. 
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possible influences. This suggests that an exploratory and grounded 
research approach is appropriate.  
• Theories of organisational learning and change (Argyris & Schön, 1996; 
Schein, 1995), are also instructive in outlining possible barriers, drivers, 
and influences of institutional response including factors such as: 
leadership, organisational culture, stakeholders, resources, learning 
processes, experience, and values/beliefs. These have been directly 
applied to understanding organisational behaviour in relation to 
participatory governance and public engagement practices (e.g. Chess 
and Johnson, 2006), including in the UK (Colbourne, 2010; Wolcott & 
Sengupta, 2010).  
• Related to this is the inability of scientific institutional cultures to reflect on 
their own cultures and their assumptions about others, including the 
public. In this sense the problem of public trust in science can be seen as 
“a symptom of a continuing failure of scientific and policy institutions to 
place their own science-policy institutional cultures into the frame of 
dialogue” (Wynne, 2006: 211). The “deeply-entrenched habitual tendency 
in science and governance to imagine possible learning as instrumental 
only” (Felt & Wynne, 2007) – as has been shown to be the case in 
participatory governance of science and technology in the UK (Chilvers, 
2010) – can limit the ability of institutions to fully understand and respond 
to the sorts of governance concerns outlined in Chapter 2, which could be 
made possible through more transformative, reflective and relational 
forms of learning (Schon, 1983).  
• Finally it is important to emphasise the prevailing conditions, or wider 
‘driving forces’, that shape the governance of science and technology (as 
alluded to in the genomics case in Chapter 3 and as implicated in 
discussions of powerlessness and personal agency in Chapter 2). These 
include: the political economy of emerging science and technologies, 
national economic competitiveness, and corporate interests (Irwin, 2006); 
the increasingly globalised nature of science and technology (Leach et al. 
2005); and power relations. This resonates with governance concerns in 
Chapter 2 about how science and technology can reinforce patterns of 
inequality and exclusion, and with situations where governance 
instruments are seen as likely to be used by powerful actors as a means 
of justifying particular positions, decisions or outcomes (Stirling, 2008). 
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